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This paper examines the empirical validity of immiserizing growth in a consistent manner.  A 
straightforward test for immiserizing growth is constructed by using the revealed preference 
framework of welfare evaluation, together with macroeconomic growth data.  We identify 34 
episodes of immiserizing growth in the post-war world economy, mostly in Africa and Latin 
America.  This suggests the existence of large distortions that outweigh the gains from 
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1.  Introduction 
 
  The indicator typically employed to evaluate a country’s economic development 
performance is the per capita economic growth rate.  Strictly speaking, economic growth 
represents an increase in the quantity of an economy, while economic development is defined 
as an increase in the welfare of an economy.
1  Yet, the relationship between development and 
growth is not necessarily monotonic.  There is a well-known phenomenon in international 
trade theory where increasing welfare and positive economic growth do not coincide.  This is 
the case of immiserizing growth.  The prototypical example of immiserizing growth is where 
export-biased growth by poor countries worsens their terms of trade so much that they are 
worse off than if they had not grown at all.
2 Although the idea of immiserizing growth has 
proved to be a remarkably important development in the theory of trade and welfare 
[Bhagwati et. al. (1998, p.369)], most economists at this time do not regard the concept of 
immiserizing growth as a real-world issue [Krugman and Obstfeld (2000, p.102)].  Despite 
the theoretical importance of this phenomenon, there is no empirical literature which 
evaluates the possibility of such immiserizing growth.  According to the ECONLIT, 77 
articles on immiserizing growth have been published between 1969 and April 2003, but none 
of them examined the empirical validity of the concept of immiserizing growth. This paper is 
an attempt to examine the empirical reality of immiserizing growth by using standard cross-
country data. 
  The conditions for immiserizing growth were first formalized by Bhagwati (1958) 
in the two goods and two countries trade model.  He showed that immiserizing growth could 
occur due to the deterioration of terms of trade despite the presence of market stability and 
even if the growing country faced an elastic foreign-offer curve [Bhagwati et. al. (1989, 
p.369)].  Moreover, even in the case of small open economies, Johnson (1967) showed the 
                                                 
1 This is the Pigouvian definition.  In a broader sense, the notion of economic development includes 
additional aspects such as sectoral transformation and income redistribution. 
2 Indeed, many economists from LDCs believed the continuous deterioration of terms of trade in 
primary product exporting LDCs during the 1950s.  This is known as the Prebisch-Singer proposition.  
Immiserizing growth is a theoretical extreme of this line of argument.     3
possibility that real income could be reduced when growth occurs in protected import-
substituting industries.  Johnson’s (1967) model indicates that a decline in a growing 
country’s terms of trade is not a necessary condition for immiserizing growth.  Subsequent 
studies showed that inducing foreign capital inflows by building tariff barriers can immiserize 
the economy [Uzawa (1969), Hamada (1974) and Brecher and Diaz-Alejandro (1977)], and 
large increases in the price of imported oil can drive an economy to immiserizing growth 
[Hamada and Iwata (1984)].  The latter is a situation where the gains arising from an advance 
in production technology may be outweighed by the loss from deteriorating terms of trade.
3 
  In general, immiserizing growth must involve some form of suboptimality.  What 
underlies the phenomenon of immiserizing growth is the fact that the country experiences 
economic growth subject to some distortion.  Using the Hicksian equivalent-variational 
measures, net change in welfare from growth can be rewritten as the sum of primary gain 
from growth at optimal policies, which is positive, and change in loss from distortion due to 
growth, which is negative [Bhagwati et. al. (1998, pp.371-373)].
4  Hence, if the incremental 
loss from the existing distortion outweighs the primary gains from economic growth, then 
immiserizing growth will follow.  Conversely, the existence of immiserizing growth indicates, 
at least, the existence of a sufficiently large distortion in the economy and could be avoided 
by removal of the distortion.   
  In spite of the theoretical importance of immiserizing growth, there is no empirical 
literature which evaluates extensively the possibility of such phenomenon.  This paper is 
devoted to investigating the empirical reality of immiserizing growth in a consistent 
framework.  A direct approach to welfare evaluation using revealed preference theory is 
applied.  In other words, we employ the Sen (1979)’s index approach to measure welfare and 
to evaluate welfare change over time.  Dowrick and Quiggin (1994) used the same idea to 
construct a cross-sectional welfare ranking of countries.  On the other hand, our study 
investigates the welfare movements of individual countries over time by using revealed 
                                                 
3 Krueger and Sonnenschein (1967) first summarized the welfare implications of changes in the terms   4
preference theory.  This framework, together with macroeconomic growth rate data, gives a 
straightforward method to test for immiserizing growth.   Section two discusses the 
framework of welfare evaluation.  In section three, the actual evaluation procedure and results 
are presented.  The final section presents concluding remarks. 
 
2.  The Framework for Evaluating Welfare Movements 
 
 Let  P(t) = [P(1, t), ⋅⋅⋅⋅⋅, P(n, t)] and C*(t) = [C*(1, t), ⋅⋅⋅⋅⋅, C*(n, t)]’ represent the 
price vector and the per capita consumption quantity vector at time t, respectively, where the 
variable n denotes the number of commodities.
5 We assume that the consumption data is 
generated by an agent’s choices or preferences, and that there is a unique bundle demanded at 
each price and budget.  Let the base year be t0.  Then, the Laspeyres quantity index, Lq, and 



















   ,  where tt t −101 << . 
 
Utilizing the Weak Axiom of Revealed Preference, we can evaluate the average welfare 
changes in this economy explicitly.  The basic framework is summarized in the following 
proposition. 
 
Proposition:  If Lq ≤ 1, then economic welfare has increased over time.   On the other hand, if 
Pq ≥ 1, then welfare has decreased over time. 
 
                                                                                                                                            
of trade.  
4 Note that this is an identity. 
5 This means that we are analyzing a representative agent’s consumption, since our purpose lies in the 
analysis of the individuals’ average welfare change and not in the estimation of aggregate welfare.  
The assumption of a representative consumer requires that all consumers have linear Engel curves with 
identical marginal propensities to consume.   5
Proof:  If Lq  ≤ 1 ⇔  P(t0 )C*(t0 )  ≥  P(t0 )C*(t−1 ), then C*(t0 ) is revealed preferred to 
C*(t−1).  Hence, economic welfare at t0 is higher than at t−1, and thus, economic welfare has 
increased over time since tt −10 < .  On the other hand, if Pq  ≥ 1 ⇔  P( t0 )C*( t0 )  ≥ 
P(t0)C*(t1), then C*(t0) is revealed preferred to C*(t1).  Hence, economic welfare at t0 is 
higher than at  t 1 , and thus, economic welfare has decreased over time since tt 01 < . Q.E.D. 
 
The intuition behind this proposition is represented in Figures 1 and 2.  Using data with the 
base year t0, we can identify the welfare increase from t-1 to t0 by checking a movement from 
the point B to the point A in Figure 1.  Similarly, a welfare decrease from t0 to t1 can be 
identified as a movement from the point C to the point D in Figure 2.  With these criteria, two 
out of the four possible directions of welfare change can be identified (Table 1).  
 
3.  Data and Evaluation Procedure 
 
  Cross-country consumption data to evaluate welfare movements is taken from 
Summers, Kravis and Heston (1980), and Summers and Heston (1984, 88, 91). These data 
sets report the consumption quantity index based on the years 1970, 1975, 1980, and 1985, 
respectively.  Therefore, we can calculate P(70)C*(t), t=50,70,75, by RGDPt×ct
6 in Summers, 
Kravis and Heston (1980), P(75)C*(t),  t=70,75,80, by RGDPt×ct
7   in Summers and 
Heston(1984), P(80)C*(t), t=75,80,85, by RGDP1t×ct
8 in Summers and Heston (1988), and 
P(85)C*(t),  t=80,85,88, by RGDPt×ct
9  in Summers and Heston (1991).  Thus, using the 
criteria in Table 1, we can identify the direction of welfare changes from actual data (Table 
2).  As shown in Table 2, directions are fully identified for the periods 1970-75, 1975-80 and 
1980-85, while during the periods 1950-70 and 1985-88, we cannot identify the welfare 
decreasing case and the welfare increasing case, respectively. 
                                                 
6 RGDPt  is the real per capita GDP expressed in 1970 US dollars, and ct  is the percentage of real 
Gross Domestic Income devoted to private consumption.    
7 RGDPt  is real Gross Domestic Income per capita (1975 international prices), and ct  is percentage of 
real GDP devoted to consumption. 
8 RGDP1t  is the real per capita GDP (1980 international prices), and ct  is the consumption share (1980 
international price).   6
 
Welfare Movements and Immiserizing Growth 
 
  The results from evaluating welfare changes employing the framework of Table 2 
are reported in the Appendix Tables A1-A6.   To summarize these results, we calculated the 
fraction of welfare increasing countries by region (Table 3).  Several aspects of the 
development process during the post-war period become apparent.  First, most developed 
countries achieved welfare increases during the entire post-war period.  Second, since 1970, 
the fraction of LDCs that have experienced welfare improvements has declined, indicating 
divergent paths of economic development within LDCs.  In particular, the fraction of African 
countries whose welfare increases falls more than LDCs in other regions.  Finally, in the 
1980s, welfare declines spread to more than half of all African and Latin American countries.  
In contrast, welfare increased in most Asian countries.  This is especially true during the 
1980-85 period when the fraction of Asian countries that experienced welfare gains was much 
larger than that of South American countries (81.0 % and 12.5 %, respectively). 
  Comparing welfare movements with data on real per capita economic growth rates 
gives a straightforward test of immiserizing growth.  We employ per capita real consumption 
growth rate to capture economic growth rate so that we can control for effects of saving and 
investment movements.  If positive economic growth coincides with declining welfare, the 
case is said to represent immiserizing growth.  In the Appendix Tables A1-A6, thickly 
bordered cells indicate the cases of immiserizing growth.  As identified in the Tables, there 
are many cases of immiserizing growth, especially in Africa and Latin America.  In Africa, 
there are 20 cases of immiserizing growth and eight cases of immiserization with positive 
economic growth can be found in Latin America.  The other cases are Afghanistan (1970-75), 
Nepal (1975-80), Netherlands (1980-85), Portugal (1980-85), Fiji (1975-80), and Papua New 
                                                                                                                                            
9 RGDPt  is the real GDP per capital (1985 international prices, Laspeyres Index), and ct  is the real 
consumption percentage of RGDP, 1985 international prices)   7
Guinea (1985-88).  These cases imply that these countries suffered from Pareto inferior 
growth due to the existence of large distortions that outweigh the gains from growth. 
 
4.  Concluding Remarks 
 
  The principal feature of immiserizing growth is the coincidence of positive 
economic growth and a Pareto inferior outcome.  Immiserizing growth indicates the existence 
of sufficiently large distortions that outweigh the gains from growth.  This paper has been 
devoted to investigating the empirical reality of immiserizing growth in a consistent 
framework of revealed preference theory.  Although immiserizing growth has been regarded 
as a theoretical issue rather than a real-world issue, our analysis identified the existence of 34 
episodes of immiserizing growth in the post-war world economy, primarily in Africa and 
Latin America.  These results imply that such countries have serious distortions of their 
economic activities.  These episodes suggest that immiserizing growth is a real-world issue 
under a certain circumstance with a high-level distortion of an economy, resulting in a 
significant loss of welfare effects of economic growth.  Therefore, it deserves further 
empirical studies, especially careful country-specific case studies  such as Kaplinsky, Morris, 
and Readman (2002).   8
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Figure 1 
The Laspeyres Quantity Index and Increasing Welfare 
 
(two goods case)                      
 




                                                              A          P(t0)C*(t-1)    P(2,t0)/ P(1,t0) 
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The Paasche Quantity Index and Decreasing Welfare 
 
(two goods case)                      
 




                                                              C          P(t0)C*(t1)    P(2,t0)/ P(1,t0) 
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                                             0                                              C*(2,•)  
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 Table 1 
Identifiable Direction of Welfare Change 
Using Data with the Base Year t0 
 
Time  
(base year: t0) 
t−1 ~ t0  t0 ~ t1 
 
Index 
Lq ≤ 1 
P(t0)C*(t0)≥P(t0)C*(t−1) 
Pq ≥ 1 
 P(t0)C*(t0)≥P (t0)C*(t1) 
Direction of  
Welfare Change  
Identified  from data 
 
+                        
 
- 
Direction of  
Welfare Change  NOT 
Identified from data    
 
(-)                       
 
(+) 







Identification of Actual Welfare Change 
 
year  1950-70 70-75  75-80  80-85  85-88  t−1  t0  t1 
base year 
(t0) 
         
1970  + 
Lq(t0=1970) ≤ 1 
- 
Pq(t0=1970) ≥ 1 
    1950 1970 1975
1975   + 
Lq(t0=1975) ≤ 1 
- 
Pq(t0=1975) ≥ 1 
   1970 1975 1980
1980     + 
Lq(t0=1980) ≤ 1 
- 
Pq(t0=1980) ≥ 1 
  1975 1980 1985
1985      + 
Lq(t0=1985) ≤ 1 
- 
Pq(t0=1985) ≥ 1 
1980 1985 1988
Note: See Table 1 for the basic framework. 
Data Sources: P(70)C*(•) is calculated by RGDP×c in Summers, Kravis and Heston (1980), 
P(75)C*(•) by RGDP×c in Summers and Heston(1984), P(80)C*(•) by RGDP1×c in Summers and 
Heston (1988),  P(85)C*(•)  by RGDP×c in Summers and Heston (1991).   
 










63.6 50.0 39.4 
Asia 
 
93.3 89.5 81.0 
Europe 
 
95.2 95.2 84.2 
North and Central 
America 
90.0 69.2 30.8 
South America 
 
88.9 81.8 12.5 
Oceania 
 
75.0 66.7 50.0 
            Source:  Appendix Tables A1-A6   13
Appendix Table A1-a 
Welfare Movements and Economic Growth Rates:  
African Countries 1 
 
Countries  \Year  1950-70  70-75 75-80 80-85 85-88 















Benin +*  +   
(-.06) 




Botswana +*  +   
(.44) 




Burkina Faso  +*  -  
(.11) 
 +   
(.10) 
 
















Central Africa  +*  -  
(-.08) 
 -   
(-.11) 
 



















Ethiopia +*      -   
(-.05) 
 







Gambia +*    + 
 (.01) 
  


























































Mari +*  +   
(.06) 
  -   
(-.03) 






Notes:  As in the framework of tables 1 and 2, ‘+’ and ‘-’ signs indicate that welfare is increasing and decreasing 
respectively.  Numbers in parentheses are per capita real GDP growth rate over time, which is calculated from  
RGDPCH in Summers and Heston (1991).  Thickly bordered cells are the cases of immiserizing growth. 
* Data on 1960 - 1970. 
** Data on 1985 - 1987.   14
 
Appendix Table A1-b 
Welfare Movements and Economic Growth Rates: 
African Countries 2 
 
Countries  \Year  1950-70  70-75 75-80 80-85 85-88 
Mauritius +*  +   
(.35) 
 +   
(.08) 
 
Morocco +* +   
(.10) 
   

























Senegal  -   
(.01) 
  -   
(-.03) 





















 -   
(-.07) 









 -   
(.02) 
Togo +*  -   
(.06) 

































Notes:  As in the framework of tables 1 and 2, ‘+’ and ‘-’ signs indicate that welfare is increasing and decreasing 
respectively.  Numbers in parentheses are per capita real GDP growth rate over time , which is calculated from  
RGDPCH in Summers and Heston (1991).  Thickly bordered cells are the cases of immiserizing growth. 
* Data on 1960 - 1970. 
** Data on 1985 - 1987. 
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 Appendix Table A2 
Welfare Movements and Economic Growth Rates: 
Asian Countries 
 
Countries  \Year  1950-70  70-75 75-80 80-85 85-88 


























India +     +   
(.10) 
 







Iran +*  +   
(.47) 
 +   
(.24) 
 
Iraq +*    -   
(-.57) 
 





























































































Notes:  As in the framework of tables 1 and 2, ‘+’ and ‘-’ signs indicate that welfare is increasing and decreasing 
respectively.  Numbers in parentheses are per capita real GDP growth rate over time , which is calculated from  
RGDPCH in Summers and Heston (1991).  Thickly bordered cells are the cases of immiserizing growth. 
* Data on 1960 - 1970. 
** Data on 1985 - 1987.   16
Appendix Table A3 
Welfare Movements and Economic Growth Rates: 
European Countries 
 
Countries  \Year  1950-70  70-75 75-80 80-85 85-88 
















































































































































Notes:  As in the framework of tables 1 and 2, ‘+’ and ‘-’ signs indicate that welfare is increasing and decreasing 
respectively.  Numbers in parentheses are per capita real GDP growth rate over time , which is calculated from  
RGDPCH in Summers and Heston (1991).  Thickly bordered cells are the cases of immiserizing growth. 
* Data on 1960 - 1970. 
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Appendix Table A4 
Welfare Movements and Economic Growth Rates: 
North and Central American Countries 
 
Countries  \Year  1950-70  70-75 75-80 80-85 85-88 



















Dominica +  +   
(.26) 











































































Notes:  As in the framework of tables 1 and 2, ‘+’ and ‘-’ signs indicate that welfare is increasing and decreasing 
respectively.  Numbers in parentheses are per capita real GDP growth rate over time , which is calculated from  
RGDPCH in Summers and Heston (1991).  Thickly bordered cells are the cases of immiserizing growth. 
* Data on 1960 - 1970. 
** Data on 1985 - 1986. 
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Appendix Table A5 
Welfare Movements and Economic Growth Rates: 
South American Countries 
 
South America 
Argentina +  +   
(.06) 
 -   
(-.15) 
 

































Guyana   -   
(-.14) 
  




 -   
(.01) 


























Notes:  As in the framework of tables 1 and 2, ‘+’ and ‘-’ signs indicate that welfare is increasing and decreasing 
respectively.  Numbers in parentheses are per capita real GDP growth rate over time , which is calculated from  
RGDPCH in Summers and Heston (1991).  Thickly bordered cells are the cases of immiserizing growth. 
* Data on 1985-1987. 
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Appendix Table A6 
Welfare Movements and Economic Growth Rates: 
Oceanian Countries 
 
Countries  \Year  1950-70  70-75 75-80 80-85 85-88 
























+* -   
(-.13) 





Notes:  As in the framework of tables 1 and 2, ‘+’ and ‘-’ signs indicate that welfare is increasing and decreasing 
respectively.  Numbers in parentheses are per capita real GDP growth rate over time , which is calculated from  
RGDPCH in Summers and Heston (1991).  Thickly bordered cells are the cases of immiserizing growth. 
* Data on 1960 - 1970. 
** Data on 1985 - 1987. 
 